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Abstract-A goaling format is outlined for the optimal determination of an oil import fee (and, possibly, 
an import fee on natural gas as well) designed to keep total imports below some given target figure. 
The model is built around given supply functions for coal, oil and natural gas, given demand functions 
for coal, oil, natural gas and electricity by private consumers and industry, and an activity-analysis type 
linear programming model of the electric utility industry. Prices of internationally traded fuels may not 
exceed world-market levels. In the integrable case, it is possible to form a (nonlinear) “economic potential 
function” which peaks at the point of solution of the energy sector model now indicated. Using the well- 
known technique of goal programming (Chames and Cooper), it is possible to adjoin goals on the maximal 
imports of fuels; the Lagrange multiplier of the goaling relation provides information about the optimal 
import fee that would see to it that these goals are attained. 
In the nonintegrable case, no optimization formulation of the energy sector model exists; it will instead 
take the form of a nonlinear complementarity format. Extending the technique of goal programming, one 
may still insist on the desired targets for the maximal imports of fuels and specify penalties for deviations 
from these targets. It is now no longer possible to minimize the total sum of penalties, but defining 
Lagrange multipliers as before, the corresponding conditions of complementary slackness may be written 
down and adjoined to the nonlinear complementarity format. 
A numerical example which mimics recorded data for 1982 is presented, and the optimal import fee is 
determined which would limit total imports of oil to 12,000 million Btu. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As the spot price of oil fell below the $20/gal mark in early 1986, the idea of an import tariff on 
oil surfaced in many countries. In the U.S.A., these proposals were countered by the President’s 
insistence not to raise taxes; the proponents therefore instead labeled it an import “fee”. The tariff 
would have several aims: to insulate domestic production from the international price drop, to 
raise general revenue to the federal government, and to reduce the U.S. strategic dependence on 
imports of oil. 
In this paper a goaling format will be presented which can be employed for the design of such 
tariff policy. Target figures are laid down for the desired maximal imports of fuels (oil and, possibly, 
natural gas); in the common fashion of goal programming the actual performance of the economy 
may exceed these targets, but unit penalties for excessive imports are assessed. 
The “optimal” tariff calculated in this paper is the tariff that will limit imports to some given 
target figure. (It would be unrealistic, in our view, to require this target figure to be zero.) 
In our view, any analysis of the supply and demand for fuels must be based on an understanding 
on the demand for alternative fuels by electric utilities. Most utilities in the U.S.A. use oil, coal, 
natural gas or a combination of these fuels as inputs for the generation of electricity. We shall 
describe this choice in terms of a linear activity analysis, i.e. it is assumed that a typical utility has 
available to it a number of discrete electricity generating “activities”; the utility aims at minimizing 
total generating costs while meeting the constraints laid down by the existing generating capacities 
and the current demand for electricity. The LP model now indicated is embedded in a setting of 
an interdependent model for the entire energy sector, involving given and known supply functions 
for oil, coal and natural gas, and given and known demand functions for oil, coal, natural gas and 
electricity on the part of all nonutility consumers. 
The present precipitous fall in oil prices is but the latest development along a trend of slowly 
falling prices in real dollars since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war (1981). In the light of this 
development, some electric utilities have been able to lower their combined fuel costs by switching 
to oil as an alternative fuel. To a degree, industry and households are also able to switch to an 
increased use of oil. When it comes to new investments, many users will choose oil as a fuel rather 
than coal or natural gas. The lessons from the turbulent years of the 1960s and 1970s teach us that 
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such substitution eventually will step up demand for oil, laying the groundwork for a rebound in 
oil prices in the future. 
The concept of equilibrium and disequilibrium in the cyclical upheavals now referred to may be 
given at least two different meanings. One notion of equilibrium would be that electric utilities and 
other users have achieved some kind of long-run stable mix of different fuels (see Gonzalez Cl]). 
Disequilibrium in this sense occurs when the long-term adjustment of the users has been disrupted, 
and when they are groping for the establishment of a new pattern of behavior. Disequilibrium is 
characterized by rapidly changing fuel mixes and changing price expectations. 
There is another, and short-term, meaning of the concept of equilibrium-that markets are 
cleared. In the terminology of economic equilibrium theory, there is equilibrium in the energy 
markets for various fuels, if the total demand equals total supply. There is disequilibrium in the 
domestic fuel balances if the domestic demand for fuel exceeds the domestic supply; the excess 
demand is covered by imports. The underlying reason why the domestic fuel market does not clear 
is that the domestic oil price is not free to take on that (no doubt quite high) price that would 
equilibrate domestic demand and domestic supply; in a free market the domestic oil price cannot 
exceed the world-market price. But this is of course exactly where an oil tariff would matter-it 
would raise the domestic price level and thus lower the domestic excess demand. 
In brief, the task at hand is to construct a goal-programming (GP) model for an entire sector of 
the economy (the energy sector) in disequilibrium. 
There are two cases. If the given demand and supply functions are integrable, it is possible to 
construct a nonlinear mathematical programming problem that represents the energy sector in the 
face of disequilibrium, imbedding the individual electric utility LP problems. The origin of this 
class of programming models is the work by Samuelson [2] in 1952 on spatial equilibrium. In an 
equilibrium problem involving given demand and supply functions for a single commodity traded 
at several distinct locations, and with given unit transportation costs, Samuelson showed that there 
exists an “economic potential function” obtained by integrating the demand and supply functions, 
which peaks at the point of equilibrium. Takayama and Judge [3] extended Samuelson’s analysis 
to several goods, provided that the demand and supply functions are integrable, so that. the 
economic potential function exists. 
The first programming model of an economy in disequilibrium that we are aware of belongs to 
Morgenstern and Thompson [4-61. They dealt with a generalization of the von Neumann growth 
model involving an open economy with the price of each good being bounded from above by a 
fixed and given import price, and from below by a fixed and given export price. Approaching the 
problem of disequilibrium along another track, Thore [7] extended Samuelson’s analysis of spatial 
equilibrium to the case of price rigidities. For yet another programming model of disequilibrium, 
see Thore et al. [S] (disequilibrium in the market for labor in Texas in the presence of sticky wages). 
In all programming disequilibrium now referred to, price rigidity is specified by laying down 
given upper and/or lower bounds on the price variables. The amount of excess demand in the face 
of a price ceiling (the amount of imports of a fuel in the face of a given world-market price) appears 
as an unknown, to be solved as part and parcel of the optimization process. In the analysis in 
Section 2 below, this analysis of disequilibrium is extended to deal with a case of GP (for a survey, 
see Charnes and Cooper [9]), laying down target values on the magnitude of the excess demand 
(= imports). We believe that this is the first application ever of GP to a situation of disequilibrium 
analysis. 
The Lagrange multiplier of the goaling relation for each fuel can be interpreted as a Pigou tax 
levied on the importation of fuel above the target amount. 
The programming format is illustrated by a numerical example in Section 3. 
The second case arises when the demand and supply functions are not integrable. No programming 
formulation of the disequilibrium economy will then exist; instead the model takes the form of a 
system of equalities and inequalities. In principle, such an independent sector model in disequilibrium 
can be solved by fixed-point methods along the lines developed in recent macro-economic 
disequilibrium theory (reference may here be made to the study of so-called “temporary equilibrium” 
associated with names like Dreze [lo], Barro and Grossman [11] and Malinvaud [12]). 
As is well known, an alternative formulation of the fixed-point format of equilibrium is that one 
of a nonlinear complementarity problem [13-151. In Section 4 below we extend this format to deal 
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with disequilibrium in the face of price rigidities, and then proceed to propose a new complementarity 
goaling feature, extending the methods of GP to the nonintegrable case. In other words, we propose 
an extension of GP to situations where a mathematical programming formulation does not even 
exist. 
This assertion may sound surprising but can be substantiated as follows. Any programming 
model, linear or nonlinear, can-under appropriate regularity conditions-be identically replaced 
by the complete set of all its attendant Kuhn-Tucker conditions. In particular, any GP model can 
be identically replaced by a set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions. 
Further, the set of all Kuhn-Tucker conditions can be written as a nonlinear complementarity 
problem. To conclude, any mathematical programming problem can be written as a nonlinear (or 
possibly linear) complementarity problem. In the present application, the latter formulation 
transcends the former in that it extends to cases of nonintegrability where the programming 
formulation does not exist but the corresponding nonlinear complementarity problem does exist. 
The term “goal programming (GP)” is then no longer appropriate; instead, we shall talk of a 
“goaling feature”. 
2. A GP MODEL INVOLVING TARGETS ON FUEL IMPORTS 
This section deals with the integrable case. “Integrability” in the present context means that it 
is possible to proceed (by means of mathematical integration) from the demand for fuels to form 
an “economic potential function” defined in the space of all quantities demanded which has the 
property that at each point its gradient equals the demand price. Similarly, it is possible to form 
an economic potential function in the space of all quantities supplied which has the property that 
at each point its gradient equals the supply price. Samuelson called the economic potential “social 
pay-off” and insisted that no economic interpretation as such should be given to it, but-as shown 
by Thore [16]-the economic potential actually can be obtained as a monotonic transformation 
of the underlying utility function, so that what we are in effect dealing with is the integration of 
the demand and supply functions to form the corresponding utility functions. 
There are four forms of energy, coal (i = l), oil (i = 2), natural gas (i = 3) and electricity (i = 4). 
Write the demand price functions pi = pi(xl, x2, x3, x4), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, where pi is measured in $ and 
.xi is measured in million Btu. Assume that the matrix 
aPi 
[ 1 axj (i,j = 1,2,3,4) (1) 
is symmetric and negative semidefinite. One can then integrate the demand price functions to form 
the economic potential function 
s i$l Pi(X) dxi. 
It is concave. 
Write the supply price functions of coal, oil and natural gas CJ~(W,, w2, w,), i = 1, 2, 3, where qi 
is measured in $ and wi in million Btu. Assume that the matrix 
3% 
i 1 awj (i, j = 1, 2, 3) 
is symmetric and positive semidefinite. One can then integrate the supply price functions to form 
the economic potential 
1 3 C qi(W) dwi. (4) 
J i=I 
It is convex. 
54 S. THORE and S. ISSER 
The conditions placed on the matrices (2) and (3) are quite severe, and in effect limit the analysis 
to certain classes of demand and supply functions. These assumptions may not necessarily be 
fulfilled in an empirical application, and we shall therefore need to extend the analysis in the present 
section to the nonintegrable case as well (Section 3 below). 
Turn now to the generation of electricity by electric utilities. A small activity-analysis type model 
will be employed to specify the production opportunities. Assume that there are k = 1, 2,. . . , K 
distinct “activities” available for the generation of electricity. Let A = [&I be the matrix of input 
coefficients, with Aki being the quantity in billion Btu of fuel i (i = 1,2,3) that is required in order 
to procuce 1 MWh of electricity, when activity k is used. The unit level of operation of each activity 
is defined as producing 1 MWh of electricity. Let z = [zJ be the vector of levels of operations. The 
vector of inputs of fuels is then ATz; these inputs are all measured in million Btu. Total national 
output of electricity is c zk MWh. 
Let the operations and maintenance costs of the electric utilities be b,$/MWh of electricity 
generated. Total operations and maintenance costs are then c b,z,. 
The possible levels of operations of each activity are bounded from above by the existing installed 
generating capacity zk < 5, k = 1, 2,. . . , K. This upper bound is also measured in MWh. 
The activity-analysis model of the operations of the electric utilities is then 
maxx (3.413 p4 - bk - ~~4, - PA, - ~Adz, 
k 
(5) 
subject to 
The maximand simply 
measured in $/million 
generated = 3.413 million Btu). 
denotes gross revenues minus costs. Since the price p4 of electricity is 
Btu, it has been multiplied by the factor 3.413 (1 MWh of electricity 
- 
zk < z, k=12 K, f ,..., 
z 2 0. 
Denote the imputed cost of violating the capacity constraint k by rk (i.e. the shadow price of this 
constraint). The dual program to model (5) then reads 
(6) 
subject to 
Ik 2 3.413P4 - b, - P,Ak, - &,, - p&3, k = 1,2 ,..., K, 
I 2 0. 
In the standard fashion of activity analysis, the constraint states that if an activity is to be 
operated, the unit return must suffice to cover all unit costs (including the shadow cost of violating 
the constraint). If the unit return does not suffice to cover these costs, the activity will not be 
operated. 
In order to develop the model of the entire energy sector step by step, consider now the following 
nonlinear model of equilibrium, embedding the activity-analysis format just presented: 
max s iil PixWi - J $, qi(w)dwi - ~b$‘k i=l 
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subject to 
Xi - Wi + C AkiZk d 0, i = 1,2,3, 
k 
xq - 3.413 1 Zk < 0, 
zk < &, k = 1,2 )...) K, 
x,w,z > 0. 
Denoting the Lagrange multipliers by pi, p2, p3, pa; rk, k = 1, 2,. . . , K, the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions read, at the point of optimum (denoted by an asterisk): 
pi* Xt - W: + C, AkiZ: = 0, i = 1,2,3, 
p4* x53.413cz: 
( > 
=o, 
rz(z: - ,Tk) = 0, k = 1,2,. . . , K; 
and further 
Pi* 2 Pi(x*), 
xf[p,* - pi( = 0, i = 1,2,3,4, 
--p; 2 - qi(w*) = 0, 
Wi*[-_Pr + qi(W*)] = 0, i = 1,2,3. 
(8) 
(9) 
Finally, 
p;-‘&, + p;A,, -f p;& - 3.413p; + r: > -bk, 
Z:(p:A,, + P;& + p:A,, - 3.413p,* + r: + b,) = 0. (10) 
Relations (8) and (9) spell out the presence of equilibrium in all energy markets, and that both the 
demand side and the supply side is adjusted to equilibrium. Relations (10) recover the cost relation 
for the electric utilities, so that the optimal solution to program (7) must provide an optimal 
solution to the linear model (5). 
We now turn to a discussion of fuel imports. It will suffice here to treat the possible importation 
of two fuels: oil and natural gas. Oil prices and gas prices are determined in world markets and in 
a competitive conomy the domestic prices cannot exceed the world-market level. (The deregulation 
of natural gas prices in the U.S.A. is a subject matter that could well be analyzed in terms of a 
mathematical programming model of the general type developed presently; for the purpose of 
simplification, however, we shall here simply assume that the market for natural gas in the U.S.A. 
is competitive.) Let the quantity of fuel i imported be mi, i = 1,2,3. It is measured in million Btu. 
Let the import price of fuel i be pi, i = 1,2,3. (If the import price of coal is put equal to some 
arbitrary large positive number, the solution imports of coal will turn out to vanish.) Then 
Pi G Pi, 
mi(p, - pi) = 0, i = 1,2,3. (11) 
In words: The domestic price of fuel i cannot exceed the import price. If the domestic price falls 
short of the import price, imports equal zero. But if there are positive imports brought into the 
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country, the domestic price must actually equal the import price. 
The following modified version of program (7) incorporates the possibility of imports of oil and 
natural gas, as specified: 
(12) 
subject to 
xi-wi+~Akizk-mi<O, i = 1,2,3, 
x4-3.4131 A .z <o 
k k~"' 
zk G zk, k= 1,2 ,..., K, 
x,w,z,m < 0. 
The constraints in the three fuel markets i = 1, 2, 3 have now been modified to allow for the 
possibility of imports as well; each such constraint states that consumer demand plus inputs into 
electric utilities cannot exceed domestic supply plus imports. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions now read 
pt(x: - w: + c Akiz: - m:) = 0, i = 1,2,3, 
k 
p4*(xq* - 3.413 c zk*) = 0, 
r?(z$ - fk) = 0, k=12 K. 9 ,*--, (13) 
We also retrieve relations (9) and (10). Finally, 
p: < pi 
mt(pr - pi) = 0, i = 1,2,3. (14) 
In short, both the demand side and the supply side are adjusted. But the fuel markets may now 
be in disequilibrium, with the excess demand being covered by imports. The electric utilities solve 
the linear activity-analysis type program (5), as before. 
Finally, we show how it is possible to lay down numerical goals on the magnitude of fuel imports. 
Write 
mi - Ui < gi, i = 1,2,3, (15) 
where gi is the target imports of fuel i, measured in million Btu and Di is the possible excess imports 
above the target. In the common fashion of GP, such deviations will be penalized, and the unit 
penalty for “over-import” is put at ai. Total penalties are then cuiui. Form the nonlinear GP 
model:? 
maX i$l PXx)dxi - Sit1 qdw)dwi - : bkzk - J2 3 m@i - s C UiUi k=l 9 9 i=1,2,3 (16) 
t In the simple version discussed in the main text, it will in general be possible to drive down all penalties to zero, so 
that the goaling feature could actually have been replaced by a “hard” constraint on imports, with the import fee being 
determined as the Lagrange multiplier of this constraint. In actual application, however, one may presumably want to 
expand the model format to include other goaling features, so that all goals cannot be attained exactly at the same time. 
This is of course precisely the situation for which GP was developed, and in the common fashion the only thing that is 
required for numerical solution is an ordinal ranking of the various goals. 
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Xi-Wi+CAkiZl,-mi~O, i = 1,2,3, 
X 4- 3.413 C AkiZlr ~ 0, 
k 
Zk < Tk, k = 1,2,. . . , K, 
mi - vi d gi, 
x, w, z, m, v < 0. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions recoup relations (13), (9) and (10). Denoting the Lagrange multiplier 
of the goaling condition (15) by Si, one also finds 
together with 
$(rnr - Vi* - gi) = 0 
and 
st < ai, 
Vi*(Sf - ai) = 0. 
(17) 
(18) 
(1% 
All the Lagrange multipliers are nonnegative, pi, Si < 0. 
The multiplier ST can be interpreted as a tariff (an import “fee”) that is levied on the 
importation of fuel i. 
To see this, simply note that as long as optimal imports are positive, relation (17) gives 
p: = pi + si*. However, if imports fall short of the target, the multiplier SF drops to zero, and the 
domestic price equals the import price. 
3. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
An illustrative numerical example representing the energy sector in the U.S.A. is being presented. 
Some care has been taken to adjust the magnitude of the various parameters o that the optimal 
demand, and production of fuels mimics actual values recorded for 1982. The purpose of the 
example is only to explain the methods of calculation of the import fee on oil; the results are not 
empirically valid. 
A realistic estimation would require an econometric analysis of the demand and supply relations, 
and studies of capacity constraints. In addition, one would presumably want to disaggregate 
demand according to sectors (residential, commercial and industrial demand, and demand for 
transportation), split the country into regions or even differ between various grades of fuels (such 
as Eastern and Western coal). Such an econometric research program would go beyond the present 
effort. 
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Write the demand price functions for energy, 
p1 = 9.63 - 46.52~10-5x, - 14.434.10-%, - 7.658.10-%, - 6.48.10-%,, 
p2 = 17.4 - 14.434~lo-%c, - 32.578. 1O-5x, - 14.02. 1O-5x, - 13.402. 1O-5x,, 
P3 = 12.5 - 7.658. 1O-5x, - 14.02. 1O-5x, - 20.50. 1O-5x, - 11.194. 1O-5x,, 
p4 = 23.2 - 6.48. 1O-5x, - 13.402. 1O-5x, - 11.194. 1O-5x, - 32.548. 1O-5x,; 
and the supply functions, 
qr = 26.325. 1O-5 wY.~~, 
q2 = 27.064. lo-’ w’$~~, 
q3 = 24.9375.10-5w;.995. 
These functions are integrable, and the economic potential (4) reads: 
9.63x, - 23.27. 1O-5x: - 7.217. 10-5x,x, - 3.829. 10-5x,x, - 3.24.10-‘x,x, 
+ 17.4~~ - 7.217.1O-5x,x, - 16.289. 1O-5x$ - 7.01. 1O-5x,x, - 6.701. 1O-5x,x, 
+ 12.5~~ - 3.829. 1O-5x,x, - 7.01. lO-5x,x, - 10.25. 1O-5x; - 5.597. 1O-5x,x, 
+ 23.2x, - 3.24. 1O-5x,x, - 6.701. 1O-5x,x, - 5.597. 1O-5x,x, - 16.274x: 
_ 13 5. 10-5w’.95 _ 13 6. 10-5w’.99 _ 12 5. 10-sw’.9= 
1 2 3 . 
The technical data and the cost data for the electric utility industry are as follows. There are six 
different activities available for the generation of electricity: activities 1 and 2 using coal as an 
input; activities 3 and 4 using oil; and activities 4 and 5 using gas as an input. The input coefficients 
are given in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Coal Oil Gas 
Activity 1 9.90 
Activity 2 10.94 
Activity 3 10.1 
Activity 4 10.6 
Activity 5 10.5 
Activity 6 10.8 
All coefficients being measured in 
million Btu/MWh. 
The operating and maintenance costs are b, = 20, b2 = 25, b, = 3, b, = 4, b5 = 3 and 
b, = 4, in $/MWh. The maximal generating capacities are Z, = 750, Z2 = 500, Z, = 100, 
.& = 150, Z5 = 150 and Zs = 200, in MWh. 
World-market prices of fuels, and importation targets are given in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
World-market price Importation target 
(%/million Btu) (million Btu) 
10.0 loo0 
4.50 12,OfM 
5.00 1000 
The quite high prices of coal and gas were chosen 
arbitrarily in order to ensure that no imports of these 
fuels would occur in the optimal solution. The 
importation targets for these fuels are entered for the 
sake of formality. 
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Numerical solution of the GP model program (16) generates the following optimal 
solution. First, the shadow-prices of energy come out as follows: 
Price of coal = 2.54 $/million Btu, 
Price of oil = 4.61 S/million Btu, 
Price of gas = 4.45 S/million Btu, 
Price of electricity = 15.48 $/million Btu (= 52.85 $/MWh). 
These are the prices that are actually going to be quoted in the domestic markets. In the 
case of oil, it lies above the world-market price. The difference equals the import fee. So, 
the import fee on oil is $4.61-$4.50 = $0.1 l/million Btu. 
The supplies of the various fuels forthcoming at these prices, and the demand, are given 
in Table 3. 
Table 3 
End use by 
Domestic Sum Use by consumers and 
SUPPlY Imports supply utilities industry 
Coal (million Btu) 15,674 - 15,674 12,767 2907 
Oil (million Btu) 18,789 12,OOa 30,789 1747 29,042 
Gas (million Btu) 18,761 - 18,761 3735 15,025 
Electricity (million Btu) 6OLXl - 6000 - 6coO 
Electricitv (MWb) 1757 - 1757 - 1757 
The importatmn target on oil is reached exactly. There are no imports of coal or gas. 
The solution to the cost minimization model for the electric utilities, program (5), 
provides information about the technical choices made (see Table 4). 
Table 4 
Activitv No. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Capacity (MWh) 
Level of operation (MWh) 
Cost breakdown (%/MWh) 
Fuel costs 
0 & M costs 
750 500 100 150 150 200 
750 488 100 69 150 200 
25.20 27.85 46.55 48.85 46.16 48.10 
20.00 25.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 
Capacity charge 1.65 3.30 3.08 0.75 
Sum price of electricity 
(SIMWh) 52.85 52.85 52.85 52.85 52.85 52.85 
Activities 1, 3, 5, 6 are operated at capacity and carry a capacity charge. Activities 2 and 
4 are operated below capacity. For every activity, however, total costs exactly exhaust the 
electricity price. 
Activities 3 and 4 use oil as input. In the cost breakdown, oil is booked at the price 
of $4.61/million Btu. The fuel cost is the price of fuel times the unit input requirement 
(Table I). 
4. A NONLINEAR COMPLEMENTARITY GOALING PROCEDURE 
The programming technique demonstrated in Section 2 involved the formation of an “economic 
potential function” which was designed so as to peak at the desired optimal point. The ultimate 
rationale of the formation of the potential function is the so-called Kuhn-Tucker equivalence 
theorem, which states that (in the present application) the point x*, w*, z*, m*, u* will be an optimal 
solution to program (16) if and only if there exists nonnegative vectors of Lagrange multipliers p*, 
I*, s* so that (x*, w*, z*, m*, v*; p*, I*. s*) satisfies all the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (13), (9), (lo), 
(14) and (17)-(19). 
As is well-known, the set of all Kuhn-Tucker conditions of a given problem of nonlinear 
programming constitutes a nonlinear complementarity problem. In the present case, they may be 
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written in the following compact notation: 
where 
C= 
Ct G d(rl), tlTCG - 441 = 0, 
C'~J 2 e, ST[CTrj - e] = 0, 
t, rl 2 0; 
A,, A21---& 0 0 0 0 
Al2 Az2--- A,, -1 0 0 0 
A,, A23 - - - 4, 0 -1 0 0 
-1 -1 --- -1 0 0 0 0 
+1 ----- 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
I I I I I 
0 ----- +1 0 0 0 0 
0 ----- 0 +l 0 -1 0 
0 ----- 0 0 +l 0 -1 
L 
t’= Cz1,z3,- -,zK,m2,m3,v2,v33, 
‘IT = CP~,P~,P3,P4~rl,- - -,rK,S2,s31, 
-d.P*9P2,P39PJ + WAP19P2,PJ) 
--X2@1,Pz,P3,P4) + Wz(Pl>P2rPJl 
-x3@1~P2~PJ,P4) + W,(P,9Pz,P,) 
-x4h~P2~P3,P4) 
and 
(20) 
2 = [-bl,..., -bK, -h, -da, -a2, -a3]. 
In order to prepare the way for the subsequent argument, note in particular that here we have 
rewritten a quite conventional GP problem in the form of a nonlinear complementarity problem. 
In particular, this formulation involves no objective function at all, so that there is no explicit 
formulation of the sum total of the deviations from the goals and there is no explicit attempt to 
minimize such a sum total. Yet, through the definitions of the goals and through the conditions of 
complementary slackness, the optimal solution of the GP problem is nevertheless ecured via the 
alternative route of the nonlinear complementarity formulation. 
The treatment in Section 2 assumed integrability, so that the potential function employed in the 
extremal formulation actually existed. Now we are set to extend our analysis to deal with the 
nonintegrable case as well. In effect, the nonlinear complementarity formulation (20) will still hold 
good even in the case when the matrices (1) and (4) are not symmetric. The formulation (20) does 
not require the integration of the demand price functions and the supply price functions. It does 
not even require the inversion of the demand functions xi(pl, p2, p3, p4), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, and the 
supply functions w,ip, , p2, p3), i = 1, 2, 3. Instead, it features these direct functions in their original 
form. 
If integrability is rescinded, the nonlinear complementarity version (20) can no longer be written 
in the equivalent format of a GP problem. What we have now is a more general goaling format 
which does not collapse into conventional GP. 
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5. IN RETROSPECT 
When the research reported in this paper was originally conceived, the general idea simply was 
to apply the techniques of GP to an energy model, featuring a goal on the desired level of 
importation of oil. In models of LP it is well-known that it is possible to insert goaling features so 
that the shadow-price of the goaling relation can be interpreted as a Pigou tax on the targeted 
commodity. We therefore figured it would be possible to construct a GP energy model so that the 
shadow-price of the goal on imports would come out as the required import fee on oil. 
The class of programming models that we had in mind was the nonlinear programming format, 
maximizing the sum of consumers’ surplus and producers’ surplus (called by Samuelson [2] “net 
social pay-off” and by Takayama and Judge [33 “quasi-welfare”), which has been used with success 
in a series of studies on the energy sector. It seemed to be a straightforward thing to tack a standard 
goaling feature onto such a formulation. We searched the literature on spatial equilibrium to see 
if there were some applications of GP to the Takayama and Judge model; although we came up 
empty-handed, the procedures involved seemed to be quite routine. 
However, two difficulties arose, and the need for considerable extensions and new theoretical 
developments became apparent. 
The first difficulty was how to handle the presence of disequilibrium. Within the programming 
format, imports of oil occur when the shadow-price of oil is bounded from above by a given world- 
market price. In other words, an a priori constraint on a dual variable in the model is laid down. 
So, one would wind up facing a nonlinear programming model involving the maximization of the 
sum of consumers’ surplus and producers’ surplus and adjoining an upper limit on the shadow- 
price of the dual of the market constraint for oil. 
As shown by the senior author in a recent study [7], it is possible to extend Samuelson’s 
programming format to solve for spatial disequilibrium as well. (See also the work by Thore et al. 
[S] which involved disequilibrium in the labor markets.) As evidenced by program (12) above, it 
is possible to apply these same developments to the case of disequilibrium in energy markets. The 
maximand in program (12) can be interpreted as the sum of all consumers’ surplus and all domestic 
producers’ surplus net of the total import bill for imported fuel. Domestic maintenance and operations 
costs are also deducted. At the point of optimum, the shadow-price of imported fuels is bounded 
from above by the world-market price. 
So, it turned out that it was possible to construct a nonlinear programming model for the energy 
sector featuring the possibility of disequilibrium in the face of given world-market prices. But there 
was more to be done. The goaling feature to be adjoined to the model would lay down a target 
figure on the magnitude on the excess demand itself, and thus intervene in the formation of 
disequilibrium. 
Program (16) accomplishes what has now been set out. It is obtained by tacking a goaling feature 
to program (12), laying down target figures on the desired volume of imports of fuels. The shadow- 
price of each fuel traded internationally is bounded from above by the world-market price. The 
shadow-price of the goaling relation equals the Pigou tax that has to be levied on the imported 
fuel in order to keep imports attaining the desired goals. 
The second difficulty was how to handle the overriding possibility of nonintegrability. If the 
demand price functions and the supply price functions for various forms of energy are not integrable, 
the maximand appearing in Samuelson’s model does not exist, and the entire nonlinear programming 
mechanism breaks down. 
With recent spectacular strides in the writing of algorithms and software that handle the linear 
and nonlinear complementarity format, we are still well-equipped to solve the resulting model 
formulations. It is of course well-known that, in the case of nonintegrability, the models that 
belong to the Samuelson and Takayama-Judge tradition can then instead be solved by linear 
complementarity methods. For an application to energy markets, see the recent work by Yang and 
Labys [15]. By extension, it is also evident that programming models of disequilibrium, as 
discussed above, in the case of nonintegrability may instead be solved by methods of nonlinear 
complementarity. 
But what will then become of GP? The very concept of GP involves the formulation of targets, 
the definition of deviations from these targets, the laying down of penalties for such deviations and 
the minimization of the sum total of all penalties. Can GP survive in a nonintegrable world where 
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an extremal formulation does not even exist? 
The answer to this question is that extremization is not a sine qua non for GP. GP, as any other 
linear or nonlinear programming formulation, can alternatively be written in a complementarity 
format. In effect, the goal program is mathematically equivalent with the task of solving the 
complementarity problem that consists of all the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions (standard 
regularity conditions being assumed fulfilled). In the present case, these Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
were listed in Section 4. 
It would seem that these remarks open up the scope for the application of goaling features in a 
wide variety of general interdependent economic models, for instance in studies of policy-making 
in macro-economic general equilibrium models. But that, of course, is a quite different story. 
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